A decade after Luttwak said no one should, someone just did!

Back in August 2013, at the height of the Syrian uprising, renowned security strategist Dr Edward N. Luttwak penned an op-ed in The New York Times: “In Syria: America Loses if Either Side Wins”. It sounded cynical, maybe even brutal, but it was a calculated warning to the White House: stay neutral in the Syrian war, let your enemies bleed one another dry, and do not let either Assad or the Islamists walk away with a win.

Why? Because, according to Luttwak, a rebel victory led by Jihadists, ‘Taliban-style Salafists’ in his language, means a regime hostile to Israel, the U.S, and its allies in the region. On the other hand, an Assad victory is literally handing over Syria to Iran and Russia. His ‘tragic’ solution? Prolong the war, arm the rebels just enough to fight, but never enough to win, and keep the fire burning. Incredibly, shortly after this proposal the U.S. literally applied that. The Congress approved funding to train Syrian rebels, just enough to sustain the fight however, not end it. The U.S. applies the Luttwakian extensively proposed “Give War a Chance” stratagem.

But fast forward to today: Assad is gone, Al-Jolani is in Damacus, and the Islamists are in power. The man once affiliated with Al-Qaeda and listed as a terrorist by the U.S is today shaking hands with Donald Trump, who also lifted sanctions on Syria during his recent Middle East tour. Wait-what?

How did all this happen? Did Washington blink? Did Luttwak’s cold logic backfire? Or did the U.S never actually lose. In other words, WHO REALLY WON SYRIA? To simplify this answer and make it short, I shall boldly argue that the Islamists who reached Damascus aren’t the same Salafi jihadists they used to be, and my points are below.

As Wictorowicz will realize in his Islamic Activism that “Where a movement frame draws upon an indigenous cultural symbols, language, and identities, it is more likely to reverberate with constituents, thus enhancing mobilization”¹. And this is precisely what we have witnessed in Syria. After taking control of Idlib and forming the Syrian Salvation Government, the Jihadists started moving further away from Salafist identity —which is mostly influenced by the Saudi-Afghan traditions, to a Syrian indigenous identity. You can see it lately in al-Jolani’s wardrobe: gone are the camo fatigues and Afghan turban. Now he appears like any other Syrian. Even his name has changed from Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (a style that signals conservation and fundamentalism) to Ahmad al-Shara’ (like any other Syrian name). But this is more than just mere optics, it is ideological repositioning.

Back in 2015 from Idlib, al-Jolani was crystal clear that Democracy is Haram. He blasted the Muslim Brotherhood, simply because they accept democracy and parliamentary systems. He condemned Mohamed Morsi for recognizing the Camp David Accords.² This critique of democracy and perceiving it incompatible with Sharia was reiterated several times by him in other interviews. Talking about Syria’s future if Damascus fall, Al-Jolani has never doubted that the existing Idlib model shall be expanded. He repeatedly emphasized (over five times in one interview) that Syria shall be governed with Sharia, and it shall be an Islamic government on the prophetic path³. When asked about the fate of minorities, he spoke of the Kitab and Sunnah, perhaps hinting at jizya and second-class status for non-Muslims in the liberated Syria. But surprisingly, in his first interview in Damascus, he dodged a direct question about Sharia in Syria. Instead of addressing the topic head-on, he emphasizes the role of history and customs in forming a new governance as he sidestepped the term ‘Sharia’ altogether. He also came back to clearly state that the Idlib model would not be ideal for the whole Syria.⁴

And here is something most analysts miss: the shift in language. For years, Hayat Tahreer al-Shām (HTS) leaders called the country al-Shām, not Syria. Al-Shām actually refers to Greater Levant: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and yes Israel. The name signaled that their jihad wasn’t just against Assad but also targeted at the long run every oppressive, sectarian, racist, and authoritarian regime within the nook and cranny of al-Shām. Today however, they simply say ‘Syria’. And al-Shara’ assures them that they would not pose a threat to any country in the region.⁵ This assertion is practically demonstrated as the Syrian Army stayed completely silent at the Southern borders, even as Israeli forces staged drills nearby.⁶ Meanwhile, online debates are ongoing between Palestinians and Syrians over why the Hamas detainees held in Assad’s prisons have not yet been released, creating tensions among the Arab family. Some now wonder if Ahmad al-Shara’ is quietly implementing his own version of the Camp David Accords? Particularly after the final bomb dropped by Trump when he met with him that ‘President Shara’ will eventually join the Abraham Accords’.⁷ Again, who won Syria? Or more importantly, who learned to play the game better?

Going back to Luttwak’s now-legendary op-ed, one of his sharpest criticisms was not aimed at Syria, but at Turkey. He argued that Ankara missed a critical window in the early days of the conflict. Turkey stood back allowing the emergence of jihadists’ groups on the battleground. But his critique was constructive as he offered a prescription: “The United States could have supported with weapons, intelligence, and advice a Turkey-based and Turkish-supervised rebellion” provided it was not led by petty warlords and dangerous extremists. Here is the twist: Luttwak did not only call for Turkey’s military cooperation, but implicitly proposed for the need of the rebels themselves to transition, to abandon raw Salafi jihadism and evolve into moderate political Islamism that the West could stomach. And today, we see that transition, although we can’t tell how exactly the events went, but Trump keeps linking the ‘smart’ Erdogan to this transformation.⁸ And he does not seem too bothered.

So again, who really won Syria? The jihadists? The U.S.? Turkey? Or maybe the man who figured out how to wear a suit, speak diplomatically, and play basketball? Most importantly, Is conservative Islamism truly incompatible with modernity and development? Because one thing is clear, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani is not the same as President Ahmad al-Shara’!

Note: The cover image accompanying this article was generated using artificial intelligence and is intended for illustrative purposes only