Almost one million Rohingya migrants are stuck in densely packed camps in Bangladesh, according to UNHCR reports. The Rohingya, a Muslim minority community, have been living in Myanmar's Rakhine State for decades. However, the Rohingya were not citizens of Myanmar due to a 1982 rule that effectively barred them from obtaining nationality. In 2017, a deadly military campaign drove almost 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. Since then, international witnesses have charged the Myanmar government with genocide or ethnic cleansing, and foreign courts are contemplating whether to issue such charges. These judicial actions are too late for the refugees, who have lost their citizenship, had their fundamental rights taken away, and are now living in exile.

Historical Background

The Rohingya's Myanmar origin dates back to ancient Arakan kingdoms and colonial migration. Subsequent regimes, however, repressed its legacy. In 1982, Myanmar's military government issued a citizenship law that effectively denied Rohingya citizenship by name. No Rohingya had the opportunity to satisfy its stringent requirements, therefore, most of them were reduced to stateless citizens of nowhere.  Rohingya did not have passports or identity cards, therefore, they could not own property, vote, or travel overseas.

This legal exclusion set the stage for repeated violence. Escalations between 2012 and 2015 forced many Rohingya into displaced person camps within Myanmar or outside its borders.  The most serious crisis occurred in August 2017, when the Rakhine State military assault destroyed communities and displaced an estimated 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. Humanitarian organizations confirm that the program involved state-sponsored ethnic cleansing. By late 2024, over one million Rohingya had been hidden in Bangladesh, while a smaller number remained trapped under military rule in Myanmar.

Statelessness and Identity

The green Rohingya flag, flapping alone above a makeshift camp, is a heartbreaking symbol of these people's misery. Despite decades of history, the Rohingya are not considered citizens of Myanmar. The UN defines a "stateless person" as someone not regarded as a national by any state. In other words, a stateless individual does not have a legal residence. For millions of Rohingya, it means a loss of daily possibility, as UNHCR observes, stateless people are often "not permitted to attend school, visit a doctor, or work." Many Rohingya children grow up in camps, never knowing a country of their own. However, the green flag they fly, which includes the word "Freedom," implies that they retain some sense of identity and aspire to dignity.

Refugee Rights and Protections

International law helps to safeguard refugees and stateless people. The 1951 Refugee Convention, which the majority of states have ratified, stipulates that refugees ought not to be returned to the country of origin. This idea, known as non-refoulement, "states that a refugee should not be returned to a place where they will face serious harm.". This means that Bangladesh and others cannot repatriate Rohingya to Myanmar while they are being legally persecuted. The Convention also included provisions for minimal refugee protection, employment, education, and health care, allowing refugees to live with dignity. Host countries differ in what they provide. Bangladesh, for example, is not a party to the Refugee Convention and must rely on humanitarian aid to help the Rohingya. Other international law combines these concepts: i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees all persons the right to nationality, characterizing the denial of citizenship as a human rights violation. These rules read together imply that Rohingya refugees have a right to security and assistance until they can rebuild their lives in security.

International and Regional Challenges

Despite these legal norms, the global reaction has all too frequently been inadequate. Bangladesh has borne the largest share. More than a million Rohingya now reside in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar camps, with some tens of thousands relocated to a far-off island named Bhasan Char. Yet Bangladesh has no official refugee law; it is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and formally treats the Rohingya as "temporary" guests,. Without legal status, Bangladesh's Rohingya cannot legally work or come and go from camps freely, and aid agencies cannot meet all needs.

Elsewhere in Asia, the record is mixed. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has no regional refugee framework: only the Philippines and Cambodia among its ten members have ratified the Refugee Convention, and regional labor agreements make no mention of asylum. Certain countries (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) grabbed headlines in 2015 for not letting Rohingya boats dock, pushing individuals back out to sea. These incidents showed how Rohingya are often treated as unwanted migrants rather than people in need of protection.

International justice bodies have taken action, but enforcement is weak. In 2019, the ICC opened an investigation into Rohingya crimes (concentrating on Rohingya who escaped via Bangladesh). And on January 23, 2020, the International Court of Justice ordered Myanmar to halt genocide against the Rohingya. However, follow-up has been slow: reports suggest some 600,000 Rohingya are still effectively trapped in camps and villages in Rakhine State with insufficient food, health care, or freedom of movement. A recent flood also revealed the danger of the camps: in May 2021, Rohingya by the thousands in Bhasan Char took to the streets during a UN visit, chanting "We don't want to live here" as they protested a lack of infrastructure and flooding. This scene underscored how international pressures and aid so far haven’t translated into safety or solutions for the refugees.

Policy Solutions and Responsibility-Sharing

The long-term solutions need to cover both the short-term needs and the root causes, such as Myanmar's transformation and international assistance. The most crucial proposals are:

• End statelessness in Myanmar. The long-term fix is for Myanmar to abolish its 1982 citizenship law and give Rohingya equal rights as citizens. This will probably take significant political transformation in Myanmar and pressure from neighbors and the U.N. If Rohingya can become citizens (or legal residents) in their native country, their statelessness and a lot of the conflict would end.
• Invest in refugees’ future. As long as return is not possible safely, the Rohingya need to be empowered. Donor governments and NGOs need to increase schooling, vocational training, and community activities in the camps. For instance, some initiatives now train Rohingya teachers and mechanics. Greater access to education and skills would make refugees feel useful and prepare them for a safer future, whether in Bangladesh or at home.
• Increase resettlement and safe passage. Wealthier nations must do more by providing permanent resettlement to more Rohingya. The United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia all have refugee quotas; these must be opened further to the most vulnerable Rohingya. Nearby Indonesia and Malaysia can also issue additional humanitarian visas or temporary work permits. This sharing of the burden reduces the strain on Bangladesh and creates new possibilities for refugees. Meanwhile, international agencies need to guarantee rigorous enforcement of non‑refoulement: states at sea or their borders should never forcibly push boats back into danger and should permit asylum claims.
• Enhance regional collaboration. ASEAN must have a foundation on refugees, albeit non-binding. Neighboring countries can have a shared fund for refugee assistance, harmonize the terms of sea rescue along borders, and develop long-term solutions should repatriation take time. Bangladesh (with U.N. assistance) requires ongoing funding to enhance camp security (e.g., gas instead of firewood stoves to avert fires). Such burden-sharing acknowledges one country's crisis as a regional concern.
• Support legal accountability. The U.N. and its member states must enforce international court rulings. The ICJ rulings and the ICC investigation need to be pursued with diplomatic pressure and, where possible, targeted sanctions against abusive leaders. Though the U.N. Security Council has been immobilized in Myanmar, like-minded states can continue to push these rulings to the forefront to secure accountability of abusers.
• Prepare for voluntary return. Lastly, any repatriation that is ultimately arranged must be strictly voluntary, safe, and dignified. The Rohingya should only return home when Myanmar ensures their security, citizenship, and freedom. In the meantime, issuing identity documents (through UNHCR or host governments) and ensuring basic social services honors their rights. This strategy of legal protection, education, and international solidarity combined holds the most promise in pushing Rohingya out of stateless limbo and into lives of dignity.

Each of these policy steps requires political will and cooperation. Without them, the Rohingya will continue to be the world's largest stateless group, exposed and in suspension. A mix of pressure on Myanmar and practical assistance to refugees and hosts is the route to justice, security, and a lasting future for the Rohingya people.